Michigan Law Review
Volume 56

Issue 1

1957

Workmen's Compensation - Federal Employers' Liability Act Basis of Liability Not Common Law Negligence
Robert L. Knauss S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Common Law Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Workers' Compensation Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert L. Knauss S.Ed., Workmen's Compensation - Federal Employers' Liability Act - Basis of Liability Not
Common Law Negligence, 56 MICH. L. REV. 143 (1957).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/39

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1957]

RECENT DECISIONS

143

WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION-FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY Acr-BASrs
OF LIABILITY NoT COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE-Petitioner, a laborer in a
railroad section gang, was assigned to burn weeds near a railroad track.
He was injured when he fell into a culvert as he was trying to escape from
smoke and flames which had been fanned by a passing train. A jury in
the Circuit Court of St. Louis awarded damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).1 The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed2
upon the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding
of the railroad's liability, and the case should not have been allowed to go
to a jury. On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held,
reversed. Statutory negligence under the FELA is significantly different
from common law negligence. Under FELA it is enough to prove that the
negligence of the employer played some part, however small, in the injury
or death of the petitioner. Rogers v. Missouri P. R. Co., 353 U.S. 500

(1957).3
The FELA has been a constant source of litigation since it was enacted
in 1908.4 The question under the FELA most frequently before the Court
has been the sufficiency of the evidence needed to allow a jury to determine

135 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1952) §§51 to 60.
2 Rogers v. Thompson, (Mo. 1955) 284 S.W. (2d) 467 (1955).
3 Companion cases with the principal case are Webb v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 352
U.S. 512 (1957); Herdman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 352 U.S. 518 (1957); Ferguson v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (1957). Justices Harlan and Frankfurter
dissented separately in the four cases.
4 There are over a thousand pages of annotations to this act in 45 U .S.C.A. (1954)
§§51 to 60. In addition, the Jones Act expressly provided that FELA standards of
liability are to apply to seamen, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §688. See also
Tables I-IV in 69 HARV. L. REv. 1441 (1956) on FELA cases.
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liability.11 In deciding this question the Court has been willing to examine
particular facts in a manner in which it refuses to do in aJmost
any other field of litigation.6 Since the FELA is a federal statute the
Court has never felt bound by the views of individual state courts, but has
attempted to apply.a federal standard.7 The FELA .is a negligence statute
and liability is based upon fault of the employer. However, the statute
imposes liability if the injury or death is caused "in whole or in part"
by the negligence of the employer.8 In addition the common law defenses
of contributory negligence,9 and assumption of risk10 have both been
denied to the employer. The cases show a definite swing on the part of
the Court from an early attitude of sympathy for the employer to a more
recent trend of sympathy for the injured employee. However, throughout
the whole period since the existence of the FELA the Court has never
indicated that the liability of the employer is not based on common law
standards of negligence.11 In recent years the Court has emphasized particularly the role of the jury in cases under the act,12 but as in the past it
has failed to depart expressly from common law standards. Much criticism
has been directed at the Court for continuing to hear these cases, and for
substituting its view of the facts for that of a lower court. 13 The majority
of the Court had apparently been trying to provide examples to state
5 See tables of cases listed by Justice -Douglas in his concurring opinion in Wilkerson
v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 at 71 (1949). See also Appendices A and B attached by
Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in the principal case at 548 and 549.
6 Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 28
U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §2071, states the grounds on which certiorari will usually be
given. See STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, 2d ed., 125 (1954): "The
Supreme Court will usually deny certiorari when review is sought of a lower court
decision which turns solely upon an analysis of the particular facts involved. . . ."
See also Justice Frankfurter's views in the principal case at 527.
7 Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350 at 352 (1943): "The rights which the
Act creates are federal rights protected by federal rather than local rules of law."
s 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1952) §§51, 54.
9 35 Stat. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1952) §53.
10 35 Stat. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1952) §54.
11,Note particularly the majority opinion in Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry. Co.,
note 7 supra, at 352; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, note 5 supra, at 61; and dissent by
Justice Frankfurter in Stone v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 344 U.S. 407 at 410 (1953).
12 From the sources cited in note 5 supra, see particularly the majority opinion
in the following cases: Schulz v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 350 U.S. 523 (1956); Stone v.
New York C. & St. L. R. Co., note 11 supra; Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay R.
Co., 338 U.S. 430 (1949); Wilkerson v. McCarthy, note 5 supra; Ellis v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 329 U.S. 649 (1947); Jesionowski v. Boston & M. R. Co., 329 U.S. 452 (1947);
Lavender v. Kum, 327 U.S. 645 (1946); Blair v. B. & 0. R. Co., 323 U.S. 600 (1945);
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 (1943), 323 U.S. 574 (1945); Bailey v.
Central Vermont R. Co., note 7 supra; Jenkins v. Kum, 313 U.S. 256 (1941) •
. 13 For criticism from members of the Court see the dissenting opinions of Justice
Roberts and Chief Justice Stone in Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co., note 7 supra,
at 354 and 358; Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Affolder v. New York C. &
St. L. R. Co., 339 U.S. 96 at 102 (1950); Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in the principal
case at 562; and Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in the principal case at
524, and in Carter v. Atlantic & St. Andrews Bay R. Co., note 12 supra, at 437
and his concurring opinion in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, note 5 supra, at 64. See also 69
HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1441 (1956).
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and circuit courts as to the proper standards to be followed. The failure
of this teaching process is exemplified by the principal case, as it represents the fourth time since 1941 that the Supreme Court of Missouri has
been reversed on this same issue of sufficiency of evidence.14
It is in light of the above history that the principal case becomes important, for it is the first time the Supreme Court has admitted that it is
not applying common law standards. Justice Brennan stated that much of
the misconception of the Missouri Supreme Court is derived from its failure
to take into account that the basis of FELA liability is significantly different from common law negligence.15 The 1939 amendments to the FELA
are cited as giving evidence of congressional intent to apply new standards,
and all cases decided prior to 1939 would have little value as authority.16
The court below in the principal case had reversed the jury primarily because it was unable to find any proximate cause between the fault of the
employer and the injury to petitioner.17 The Supreme Court makes clear
that the common law doctrine of proximate cause has no bearing in FELA
actions. If the fault of the employer played any part, however small, in the
injury, liability is established. This determination must be made by a
jury unless it is not possible that reasonable men would have any doubt
on the subject. Contrary to prior cases, it would seem that a mere scintilla
of evidence as to causation would be enough to allow a case to go to the
jury.18 The effect of this case is to admit expressly what has been true in
fact, that the FELA is not just a negligence statute but is in a position between a negligence act and a workmen's compensation act. The Court has
done much to clarify the situation by this decision, but it is desirable that
the Court in the future continue to express this statutory basis for FELA
liability, and overrule prior cases inconsistent with this position.19 Because of the confusion which has been built up over the years by the
various opinions of the Court it will probably be necessary for the Court
to continue hearing cases of this nature. If the Court, however, will consistently follow the views of the principal case, making clear how statutory
negligence differs from that at common law, it may be hoped that the confusion will gradually dissipate, and that the Court can cease to deal with
these evidentiary matters which are best dealt with at a lower level.

Robert L. Knauss, S. Ed.
14 The three prior Missouri cases are Lavender v. Kum, note 12 supra; Seago v.
New York Cent. R. Co., note 11 supra; and Jenkins v. Kum, note 12 supra.
15 Principal case at 509.
16 Principal case at 508 and 509. See note 8 supra.
17 Rogers v. Thompson, (Mo. 1955) 284 S.W. (2d) 467 at 471.
18 See Justice Harlan's dissent, principal case at 559. Note that the specific question
involved is that of the causal relationship between fault and the injury. The burden
is still on the petitioner to show negligence of some nature on the part of the employer.
See Herdman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., note 3 supra.
19 For the Court to be consistent it is definitely necessary to overrule Brady v.
Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476 (1943). In addition Moore v. Chesapeake &: Ohio R. Co.,
340 U.S. 573 (1951), if not overruled, should ,be clearly distinguished as not dealing
with causation.

